Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Ors.

Mohd Ahmed Khan, an advocate, married Shah Bano Begum in 1932 and had five children. In 1975, after 43 years of marriage, Khan drove Shah Bano out of the matrimonial home. In April 1978, she filed a petition before the Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Indore, under Section 125 CrPC seeking Rs. 500/month in maintenance, citing Khan's professional income of Rs. 60,000/year.

While the petition was pending, Khan divorced her by irrevocable talaq on 6 November 1978 and deposited Rs. 3,000 in court as Mahr and iddat maintenance, claiming his obligations under Muslim personal law were fully discharged. In August 1979, the Magistrate ordered Rs. 25/month. In July 1980, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in revision enhanced maintenance to Rs. 179.20/month. Khan appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, arguing that Section 125 does not override personal law and that Mahr satisfies Section 127(3)(b) CrPC.†

"Section 125 is truly secular in character. It does not matter whether the parties are Hindus, Muslims, Christians or Parsis. The liability imposed by Section 125 to maintain close relatives who are unable to maintain themselves is founded on the individual's obligation to society to prevent vagrancy and destitution. Mahr is an obligation imposed by Muslim law upon the husband as a mark of respect for the wife. It is paid in consideration of the marriage, not on divorce."

Official registers and case diary entries documented the factual sequence and statutory triggers under CrPC §125; CrPC §127(3)(b); Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937; Art. 44 Constitution of India.†

The Petitioner argued against arbitrary enforcement, while the Respondent maintained statutory legitimacy and public interest.

The Supreme Court of India deliberated on constitutional safeguards, statutory interpretation, and judicial precedents.¶8

Section 125 CrPC is a provision of general, secular application that does not yield to personal law. A divorced Muslim wife unable to maintain herself is entitled to maintenance under it, even beyond the iddat period — because Mahr is not a sum "payable on divorce" within Section 127(3)(b), and because Muslim personal law, on the Court's reading, does not contemplate leaving an indigent divorced wife without support at all. The Court also placed on record a separate observation — not part of its operative holding — regretting that Article 44 of the Constitution, the directive to secure a Uniform Civil Code, remained unimplemented, and urging the State to act on it.¶12